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[REDACTED]

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21 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Special Security Center, OS

SUBJECT: Security Procedures for NRP Study,
Applied Research and Advanced
Development Projects

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REFERENCE: [REDACTED]

1. Unfortunately, but perhaps necessarily, the Reference does not provide any real answer to the key question of when an R&D study or developmental project should formally go into [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The reason the answer is difficult to fashion is that many factors, mainly political and often other than security, come into play. Practically speaking, a project gets placed into the [REDACTED] usually as a prelude to, or an immediate aftermath of, a funding negotiation with the DNRO or his staff. If, from a funding standpoint, the Program Director or his Project Directors find themselves financially independent of the NRP, then more than likely the effort will be operated as a unilateral CIA or USAF effort.

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2. The above situation is not necessarily a damaging thing from a security standpoint as long as the local security units strictly adhere to [REDACTED] style personnel and physical security programming for the efforts in question. This is more or less what the Reference is saying in paragraphs 5.c. and 5.d., but it would seem appropriate for the sentiments to appear earlier in the paper in an effort to highlight and emphasize the point.

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3. In paragraph 5.b. there seems to be tacit acceptance of the idea of using current [REDACTED] projects

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NRO review(s) completed.

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as umbrellas to cover R&D efforts in their embryonic stages of development. In the face of the confusion that such an approach can and has caused [REDACTED] [REDACTED] being processed for individuals for use on USAF's S-2 efforts, etc.), it is hard to comprehend why this is ever necessary when a PSAA approval can be used as the clearance instrument with no loss in security criteria nor chaos in the records. In addition there is the awkwardness that sets in when there are no previous [REDACTED] approvals to use as a basis for negotiation or interaction with a company. Does SSC endorse the [REDACTED] practice of using the DOD Secret clearance as a substitute for the [REDACTED] Approval in cases such as this?

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4. As previously noted, the concern persists here that the Director of Security should not be a very vocal exponent of the "NRP Registry" idea even though to the outside world this is so logical a solution. The concept is politically loaded and undoubtedly will draw heavy fire from Project Directors who feel the need to pursue R&D interests in an autonomous fashion up to the point of establishing feasibility and reliability for their projects. Accordingly, it is recommended that the registry notion be portrayed in the Reference in a more low key fashion as merely one approach that might be taken.

5. The above comments notwithstanding, the Reference, as written, does not pose serious problems to this office, and if need be it can be followed in this program with no loss in security flexibility. On this basis, you can consider this a concurrence from here if this approach is deemed mandatory by the SSC.

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Chief, Security Staff
OSA

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OSA/SS/ [redacted]

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